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STATE v. STEWART:
SELF-DEFENSE AND BATTERED WOMEN:
REASONABLE PERCEPTION OF DANGER
OR LICENSE TO KILL
INTRODUCTION
Kansas, poised on the brink of enlightenment, recently took two
steps backward in resolving self-defense issues in battered women
homicide cases. In State v. Stewart' the issue was whether self-defense
instructions can be given when a battered woman kills her sleeping
spouse. The Kansas Supreme Court held that because the woman was
in no imminent danger at the time of the act, no self-defense instruction
could be given. In reaching this conclusion, the Kansas court failed to
apply its own well-established rule that a defendant is entitled to self-
defense instructions if there is any evidence supporting self-defense. Fur-
ther, the court also side-stepped its carefully crafted definition of "immi-
nent" danger? Thus, the court's concern was not the use of self-defense
instructions. Rather, the court was faced with the fear that the battered
woman syndrome would become a defense per se and give women a license
to kill.
First, this Note explores the criminal justice system's ineffective
response to wife abuse, the law of self-defense, and the impact of battered
woman syndrome on the doctrine of self-defense. Then, the Note evaluates
the Kansas court's denial of self-defense instructions in view of its previous
holdings on quantity of evidence and imminent danger. The remainder
of the Note analyzes the unfounded fear that the battered woman syn-
drome could become an independent form of self-defense and sanction
unnecessary self-help. The Note concludes that successful use of battered
woman syndrome testimony ensures the woman's right to act in self-
defense and restricts only her husband's license to kill.
BACKGROUND
Wife' bashing may be the most underreported crime in America,
1 243 Kan. 639, 763 R2d 572 (1988).
State v. Hill, 242 Kan. 68, 79, 744 R2d 1228, 1236 (1987).
' Stewart, 243 Kan. at __, 763 R2d at 578. "Imminent" was distinguished from "immediate"
danger in State v. Hundley, 236 Kan. 461, 465-66, 693 P2d 475, 479 (1985).
4 The term "wife" will be used in this Note for any female living with a male, married or unmarried.
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with wives actually reporting only one in five beatings? Battery is the
most common cause of injury to women, injuring more women than auto
accidents, rapes, and muggings Statistics from the Akron Battered
Women's Shelter indicate that there are 28 million battered women, ap-
proximately one in every four women? Despite this evidence of wholesale
violence against women, the criminal justice system has ineffectively
responded to wife beating?
Criminal Justice System Minimizes the Criminality of Wife Abuse
Although the law no longer condones domestic chastisement, law
enforcement officers only half-heartedly recognize wife beating as criminal
behavior? The concepts of marital privacy and wife-as-property continue
to influence the criminal justice system's response to wife abuse.0 Police
are reluctant to respond to domestic violence calls and to arrest batter-
ing husbands 1 Police have good reason for their caution; domestic violence
calls are the leading cause of police killings 2 The unstated policy of nonar-
rest by police has come under attack as an abuse of police discretion, but
police officers argue that there is no need to risk lives because battered
wives rarely press charges.3
The judicial system has also fostered an ineffective position on wife
abuse. Overburdened district attorneys recognize the high attrition rate
in domestic violence cases, routinely assign them a low priority, and im-
plicitly support the police policy of nonarrest 4 The battered victim faces
the burden of proceeding with a disfavored case, feeling she will be respon-
sible for her abusive husband's incarceration, loss of employment, and
probable retaliation. 5
Ineffectiveness characterizes two other remedies available to the
battered woman: temporary restraining orders (TRO's) and mandatory
5 Akron Battered Women's Shelter, Fact Sheet (1988). Akron Battered Women's Shelter provides vic-
tims of domestic violence a physically and emotionally safe shelter facility, 24-hour emergency crisis
helpline, a 24-hour pickup service, in-shelter counseling, community support groups, legal advocacy,
a children's program, and speaker's bureau. In 1988, they sheltered 965 women and children, and
answered 4262 crisis calls. Id.
6 Id.
7Id.
' Note, The Battered Wife's Dilemm: 7b Kill or to be Killed, 32 HAsTINGs L. 895, 897 (1981).
9 Id.
10 Id.
"Id. -at 905.
"2 Fact Sheet supra note 5. Nationally, domestic violence calls are responsible for 40% of police in-
juries and 20% of the deaths of police officers while on duty. Id.
11 Note, supra note 8, at 906-07.
1" Id. at 910-11.
15 Id. at 911.
[Vol. 23:1AKRON LAW REVIEW
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diversion programs. TRO's are frequently used but are ineffective because
they require police officers to actually witness the violation before they
can make an arrest. s Although the court order might enjoin the abusive
spouse from "molesting, attacking, striking, threatening, sexually
assaulting or battering"" his wife, she would have to call the police as
he begins the violent assault so that they could witness the abuse i s It
may be that few women can get to a telephone at that time. In addition,
few husbands continue the battering once the police arrive.9 Further, the
battered woman must go through an expensive, complex legal procedure
before she can obtain an enforceable but largely ineffective TROPs
Mandatory diversion programs exacerbate the difficulties battered
women encounter in the legal system?' Diversion programs use media-
tion to attempt to satisfactorily resolve the problem and to achieve judicial
economy?2 Unfortunately, they may attain only one of the objectives -
judicial economy.3 Mediation fails in wife abuse cases because the goals
of mediation are incompatible with stopping violence?" Mediation's goals
are to reach an agreement, to reconcile the parties, and to "recognize
mutual responsibility for the problem.'2 " The last objective implicitly en-
dorses the fallacy that although the man is violent, somehow the woman
provoked him and is jointly responsible?6 Thus, the battered woman's en-
counter with the legal system includes a non-arrest policy, district at-
torneys reluctant to prosecute, expensive, complex and ineffective TRO's,
and diversion programs that blame the victims for the violence suffered.
Abandoned by the criminal justice system, the battered woman who
defends herself confronts a host of ineffective legal defenses. Defense
'6 Id. at 912.
I d. at 913 n.116 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 4359(a) (West Supp. 1980)).
18 Id. at 912.
19 Id. at 903-04.
20 Id. at 912.
21 Id. at 914.
22 Id. at 914-15.
23 Id. at 915.
Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on
Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 72 (1984). Professor Lerman rejects the conciliation model in
domestic violence cases; she contends that mediation fails to protect women from future violence
and perpetuates their continued victimization. The article advocates a law enforcement model that
protects victims, holds abusers responsible for stopping the violence, and legally enforces'media-
tion agreements.
25 Id. at 72.
21 Id. at 86.
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attorneys and scholars have suggested temporary insanity;7 diminished
responsibility;8 heat-of-passion; 9 and imperfect self-defense" as viable
defenses for the battered wife. However, if the abused woman uses tem-
porary insanity as a defense, she is labeled borderline psychotic and may
face mandatory commitment in a mental institution?' Experts on domestic
violence categorically reject use of temporary insanity pleas and assert
that the battered wife rationally concludes that she will be killed by her
batterer unless she defends herself?2 Diminished responsibility mitigates
the intent necessary to commit a murder but generally allows convic-
tion of the woman on a lesser charge?3 Heat-of-passion and imperfect self-
defense may also result in mitigation of the murder charge to the lesser
offense of manslaughter 4 Self-defense remains the battered woman's best
defense to the charge of murder?3
Traditional Self-Defense Doctrine Discriminates Against Abused Women
The doctrine of self-defense justifies the use of reasonable force when
(1) one who is not the aggressor, (2) reasonably believes, (3) she is in im-
2
7 Comment, The Defense of Battered Women Who Kill, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 427,429 (1987). Comment
advocates use of the defense of temporary insanity when the battered woman cannot establish the
elements of self-defense. It asserts that the presence of the battered women syndrome supports the
theory that the women views her situation from a psychologically distorted perspective, sometimes
suffers from other mental health problems, and frequently is not aware that she has killed her bat-
terer until told by a third party. The Comment acknowledges that use of the defense may require
mandatory commitment in a mental institution as a trade-off against a homicide charge but it points
out that, in some jurisdictions, the woman may elect voluntary commitment or outpatient
psychotherapy.
It is significant for this Note that Kansas is one of the minority jurisdictions requiring man-
datory commitment of persons acquitted by reason of insanity. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(1) (1981
& Supp. 1987). Further, Kansas presumes that if the person was mentally ill at the time he commit-
ted the crime, his mental illness "is of a continuing nature." Comment, supra, at 446.
' Hudsmith, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome in Battered Women's
Self-Defense Cases in Louisiana, 47 LA. L. REV. 979, 987 (1987).2 9 Comment, Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-of-Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self
Defense, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1679, 1682 (1986). Comment examines sex biases in defenses to homicide
charges and the use of fear in manslaughter cases. It argues that juries should consider more than
immediate events when deciding whether the victim provoked the defendant to commit murder.
35 Id. at 1682. See also W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW 463 (2d ed. 1986). The emerging doc-
trine of imperfect self-defense mitigates the offense when the defendant uses force in an honest but
unreasonable belief that she was under an imminent attack by the victim. Id.
31 Comment, supra note 27, at 442-45.
32 Note, supra note 8, at 918. A woman kills when she perceives that she is going to die. It is the
sanest moment of her life. Interview with Lynn Bravo Rosewater, Ph.D. (Feb. 9, 1989). Dr. Rosewater
specializes in domestic violence victims and travels the country testifying at trials of battered women
who have been charged with murder or attempted murder of the man who beat them. She is one
of the founders of Women Together, the Cleveland Battered Woman's Shelter.
3 See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 30, at 368-69.
Comment, supra note 29, at 1682, 1710.
3 Note, supra note 8, at 918.
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minent danger of harm, and (4) a particular degree of force is necessary
to prevent that harm3 " In most jurisdictions, women threatened with bodi-
ly harm do not have to retreat from their home before using deadly force
against a cohabiting aggressor.?7 When the person acts reasonably, self-
defense is a complete defense to murder?' A homicide committed in self-
defense is justified rather than excused and results in acquittal rather
than mitigation to a lesser offense. 9
Reasonableness is the key to the self-defense doctrine: reasonable
belief as to the imminence of harm and the force necessary to repel it.
Reasonableness, however, becomes a stumbling block to the battered
woman when it is defined according to a sex-biased "reasonable man"
standard.0 A battered woman's reasonable response to physical violence
is likely to be different from a man's response because of the atypical
self-defense setting in which she acts and because of her size, strength,
and socialization..
The Washington Supreme Court first recognized that the traditional
self-defense standard failed to consider a woman's use of force in light
of her own perceptions of the situation. 2 State v. Wanrow did not involve
an abused wife, but rather a woman who shot a man she believed was
a child molester. One of the grounds on which the case was reversed
was that the jury instructions concerning reasonable force denied Wanrow
equal protection. 4 The court found it unlikely that a 5'4" woman with
a cast on her leg and using a crutch could repel an attack by a 6'2" in-
toxicated man without using a weapon, even though the man was
unarmed.'5
Wanrow not only addressed the use of a reasonable degree of force,
it tackled the thornier question of a woman's reasonable belief as to the
imminence of harm:' 6 In domestic violence situations where the wife
36 See W. LAFAVE & A. Scowr, supra note 30, at 454.
11 See id. at 460-61.
"Id. at 454.
3 Id. at 454-55.
40 Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARv. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 623, 636 (1980).
41 See id. at 631-37.
42 State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977).
" Id. at 226, 559 P.2d at 551.
" Id. at 240, 559 P.2d at 558-59.
45 Id.
41 Id. at 235-36, 559 P.2d at 556.
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kills during an acute battering incident, her self-defense claim is likely
to succeed. 47 However, when the killing does not occur during an acute
battering incident, the battered woman's self-defense plea frequently
depends on the jury considering all of the circumstances surrounding the
killing.' Battered women might kill during an apparent time lag between
the violent acts and the deadly act.'9 If the jury is allowed to consider
all of the surrounding circumstances, then the jury can consider the bat-
tered woman's perception of imminent danger ° Ultimately, however, the
abused wife's self-defense plea can only be understood within the
framework of the battered woman's syndrome.
Battered Woman Syndrome Demonstrates Imminence of Danger
The battered woman syndrome attempts to explain the reactions
of women trapped by domestic violence in terms of the cycle theory of
violence and the theory of learned helplessness5 l According to the cycle
theory of violence, abusive relationships develop a recurring cycle of three
phases: a period of tension-building, followed by an acute battering episode,
followed by a period of loving contrition!5' During the first phase, the
abuser gradually escalates the tension with mean and abusive acts; the
woman recognizes the danger signals and attempts to please him to ward
off his hostility!5' The tension escalates and finally explodes in an acute
battering incident5 4 In the final phase, the uncontrollable release of ten-
sions is followed by profuse apologies which may provide positive rein-
forcement for the woman to remain in the relationshipP5 Over the course
of a battering relationship the violence increases in frequency and severity,
while the loving contrite behavior declines!' Pursuant to a learned
Comment, supra note 27, at 434.
Note, supra note 8, at 920-21.
49 Schneider, supra note 40, at 634.
10 Id. at 634-35. The battered woman's perception of imminent danger is based on her intimate
knowledge of the abuser and his history of violent acts. Id.
51 L. WALKER, THE BArrERED WOMAN SYNDROME, 147-151 (1984). Licensed psychologist Lenore Walker
identified characteristics of the syndrome after clinical research with hundreds of battered woman.
Dr. Walker defines a battered woman as "a woman, 18 years of age or over, who is or has been in
an intimate relationship with a man who repeatedly subjects or subjected her to forceful physical
and/or psychological abuse" Id. at 203. To dispell some of the myths surrounding battered women,
and to attempt to explain why women remain in a battering relationship, Dr. Walker advances both
the cycle theory of violence and the learned helplessness theory. Because the battering is cyclical,
the woman experiences a reconciliation period during which the abuser's loving behavior persuades
her to remain, hoping the abuser will change. Inevitably, tension rebuilds and the woman recognizes
signs of the impending acute battering stage. Repeated over time, the battered woman's inability
to control the batterer's violence reinforces her mounting feelings of helplessness and powerlessness.
Id. at 203.
52 Id. at 95.
53 Id.
See id. at 95-96.
51 Id. at 96.
"See id. at 147-51.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:1
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helplessness theory, battered women learn the probability of being beaten
by recognizing specific predictive cues in the batterer's behavior.7 Their
inability to control the impending violence generalizes into a feeling of
helplessness about all aspects of the relationship, including their ability
to escape from the relationship." The unrelenting cycle of violence and
feelings of helplessness place the battered woman in a constantly
heightened state of terror because she believes that one day the batterer
will kill herPs Thus, to the battered woman, the threat of violence is con-
tinuously imminent, the abuser's earlier threats are still in force, and
the imminent danger arguably justifies self-defense even in a period of
apparent calm.O
The reasons battered women stay with their husbands, despite their
constant state of terror and their perceived inability to escape from the
battering relationship, can only be explained in the context of the bat-
tered woman syndrome." The psychological effects of repeated brutal
beatings are beyond the understanding of the average person. 2 Conse-
quently, courts in a growing number of jurisdictions admit expert
testimony on the battered woman syndrome." In 1986, Kansas courts
17 Id. at 102.
U Comment, supra note 27, at 432.
"Note, supra note 8, at 928.
oId. at 929. See also W LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 30, at 458. (If the threatened harm cannot
be avoided if the victim waits until the last moment, self-defense must permit acting earlier.)
" See Schneider, supra note 40, at 645-46.
2 Fennell v. Goolsby, 630 F. Supp. 451, 458 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
'6 Id. at 459. Ohio is the only state that unilaterally does not allow expert testimony on the bat-
tered woman syndrome, according to psychologist, Lynn Bravo Rosewater. Zorc, Speaking Out for
Women Who Kill, Akron Beacon Journal, Beacon Magazine, Jan. 29, 1989, at 5, col. 2. In the leading
Ohio case, a jury found Kathy Thomas guilty of murder. The Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court's judgment on the ground that excluding expert testimony on the battered
woman syndrome was reversible error. The Ohio Supreme Court later reversed the Court of Ap-
peals. The Supreme Court refused to admit expert testimony because the battered woman syndrome
was not sufficiently developed as a matter of accepted scientific knowledge to warrant expert opi-
nion. The court further ruled that expert testimony is irrelevant and that the average juror
understands domestic violence in a way that makes expert testimony unnecessary. State v. Thomas,
66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 521-22, 423 N.E.2d 137, 139-40 (1981).
Dr. Rosewater believes that this lack of understanding in Ohio courts has resulted in many
women in Ohio not getting fair trials. Zorc, supra, at 6, col. 4. Shortly after Thomas, the American
Psychological Association, representing more than 55,000 psychologists, strongly endorsed expert
testimony on battered woman syndrome. In an Amicus Curiae brief, the Association argued: (1)
that the standards for evaluating the state of scientific knowledge in an area only require that the
expert's methodology be "generally accepted by the relevant scientific community;" not that it be
accepted unanimously or that it be infallible; and (2) "the methodology used by psychologists stu-
dying battered women is generally accepted by the relevant scientific community and the state of
scientific knowledge supports a reasonable expert opinion" on the syndrome. Amicus Brief of the
American Psychological Association, Hawthorne v. State, 408 So.2d 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(No. VV-307).
Summer, 1989]
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endorsed admission of expert testimony64 to prove the nature and effect
of wife-beating just as it was admissible to prove "the standard mental
state of hostages, prisoners of war, and others under long-term life-
threatening conditions."65 With acceptance of expert testimony on bat-
tered woman syndrome and emphasis on considering all circumstances
when determining justification for self-defense, Kansas courts were on
the cutting-edge of judicial thinking - but then the Stewart opinion was
issued. 6
FACTS
Peggy Stewart endured twelve years of physical and emotional abuse
from her husband, Mike 7 Mike brutally beat and kicked her, sexually
assaulted her two daughters, shot her cat, adulterated her medications,
and repeatedly held a shotgun to her head and threatened to pull the
trigger s In early May, 1986, Peggy escaped to Oklahoma but, within the
month, Mike found her and brought her back s Upon their return to Kan-
sas, Peggy recognized Mike's violence building ° She knew that Mike was
going to retaliate for her running away!1 Throughout the day and eve-
ning after their return to Kansas, Mike increased his sexual demands
and made veiled threats against her life!2 Peggy found a loaded gun, which
she hid?3 That night, Peggy thought about suicide and heard voices in
her head telling her to "kill or be killed.174 She retrieved the loaded gun
and killed Mike as he slept 5
" State v. Hodges, 239 Kan. 63, 716 P2d 563 (1986).
" State v. Hundley, 236 Kan. at 467, 693 P2d at 479.
66 Id.
17 State v. Stewart, 243 Kan. at __ , 763 P2d at 574-75.
61 Id. at __ , 763 P2d at 574-75. "He abused both drugs and alcohol, and amused himself by
terrifying Peggy, once waking her from a sound sleep by beating her with a baseball bat. He shot
one of Peggy's pet cats, and then held the gun against her head and threatened to pull the trigger."
"Two social workers informed Peggy that Mike was reportedly taking indecent liberties with her
daughters'" At one point, Peggy confronted Mike. "Mike responded by holding a shotgun to Peggy's
head and threatening to kill her. Mike once kicked Peggy so violently in the chest and ribs that
she required hospitalization.' Id.
69 Id. at __, 763 P.2d at 575.
70 Id. at __,763 P.2d at 575-76. "Dr. Hutchinson testified that Mike was preparing to escalate
the violence in retaliation for Peggy's running away. She testified that loaded guns, veiled threats,
and increased sexual demands are indicators of the escalation of the cycle." Id. at __, 763 P.2d
at 576.
" Id. at __, 763 P.2d at 575. "Peggy testified that Mike threatened to kill her if she ever ran
away again.' Id.
71 Id. "When they reached the house, Mike ... forced her to have oral sex four or five times in the
next 36 hours, with such violence that the inside of her mouth was bruised?' Id. at __, 763 P.2d
at 581. "[A]s she cleaned house, Mike kept making remarks that she should not bother because
she would not be there long, or that she should not bother with her things because she could not
take them with her.' Id. at __ , 763 P.2d at 575.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:1
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The State charged Peggy Stewart with murder in the first degree!'
Peggy pleaded not guilty and claimed self-defense: 7 Expert testimony
showed that Peggy suffered from the battered woman syndrome!8 The
trial judge instructed the jury on self-defense and the jury found Peggy
not guilty!' The prosecutor reserved questions for appeal.8° The Kansas
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The question the prosecutor reserved was whether the trial judge
erred in giving self-defense instructions when the victim was not im-
minently threatening the defendant.82 A related question was whether
the court would allow the battered woman syndrome to expand the self-
defense justification for use of deadly force! 3
ANALYSIS
Reasonableness is central to the doctrine of self-defense: reasonable
belief as to: 1) the imminence of harm and 2) the necessary force to repel
it. In Kansas, when self-defense is asserted, the abused wife can introduce
evidence of her batterer's prior cruel and violent actions. 5 Expert
testimony is admissible to show the systematic build up of fear and ter-
ror which influences the battered wife's reasonable apprehension of danger
and her perceived need to defend with deadly force.86 Reasonableness as
to imminence of danger and need for deadly force is evaluated by a two-
pronged self-defense test:
1) a subjective standard - the woman's own sincere and honest
belief that it was necessary to kill in order to defend herself; and
2) an objective standard - "how a reasonably prudent battered wife
would perceive the aggressor's demeanor.''8 7
76 Id. at ____ 763 P.2d at 574.
77 Id
78 Id.
79 Id.
10 Id. at __, 763 P2d at 572.
81 Id.
12 Id. at __, 763 P.2d at 574.
83 Id. at __, 763 P.2d at 576.
" Id. at __, 763 P.2d at 577. See also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3211 (1981). "A person is justified
in the use of force against an aggressor when and to the extent it appears to him and he reasonably
believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or another against such aggressor's immi-
nent use of unlawful force.'
s' State v. Hundley, 236 Kan. at 464, 693 P.2d at 477.
Id. at 467, 693 P.2d at 479.
8 Stewart, 243 Kan. at __ , 763 P2d at 577.
Summer, 1989]
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The issue in Stewart was whether the trial court erred by giving
jury instructions on self-defense.88 This note will focus on: 1) the Stewart
court's denial of self-defense instructions despite its own precedent that
provides they should be given if there is any evidence supporting self-
defense, and 2) the court's abrupt narrowing of the time-frame surround-
ing the fatal incident. The Note then addresses the court's unstated fear
that the battered woman syndrome will become an independent form of
self-defense and give women unrestrained freedom to kill.
The court failed to apply precedent that any evidence entitles
a defendant to selfdefense instructions
In State v. Hill, Kansas courts established the quantum of evidence
required for self-defense instructions: any evidence to support a claim of
self-defense." They might have required sufficient evidence or substan-
tial evidence but chose to require any evidence; 90 "some... even a lit-
tle.., no matter how great or how small.""1 The Kansas court reiterated
that rule in Stewart but failed to apply it?2 The Stewart dissent conclud-
ed that Peggy Stewart "met her burden of showing some competent
evidence that she acted in self-defense "' 93 The majority, however, chose
to ignore:
1) The evidence of Mike's past abuse,
2) the escalation of violence,
3) his threat to kill her should she attempt to leave him, and
4) expert witness' testimony that appellee was indeed in a "lethal
situation' 94
83 Id. at _ , 763 P.2d at 576.
"State v. Hill, 242 Kan. at __, 744 P2d at 1236. (emphasis added) "A person must have a belief
that the force used was necessary to defend himself and, also, show the existence of some facts that
would support such a belief." Id. (quoting State v. Childers, 222 Kan. 32, 48, 563 P.2d 999, 1011
(1977). "The issue is whether there is any evidence supporting defendant's statement that the force
she used was necessary to defend herself." Id.
Id. Compare with, State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984) (Washington requires
"sufficient" evidence to be entitled to self-defense instructions).
91 THE WORLD BOOK DICTIONARY 97 (1975).
" State v. Stewart, 243 Kan. at __, 763 P.2d at 577.
93 Id. at __, 763 P.2d at 580 (Herd, J., dissenting). Justice Herd traced the formulation of self-
defense instructions to State v. Simon, 231 Kan. 572, 646 P.2d 1119 (1982) (defendant did not shoot
victim when approached but waited until victim was innocently entering his own duplex), and earlier
to State v. Kelly, 131 Kan. 357, 291 P. 945 (1930) (self-defense instructions given because "self-defense
was woven into" the defendant's testimony; defendant did not plead self-defense). Id.
"Stewart at _ , 763 P.2d at 580 (Herd, J., dissenting).
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:1
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Kansas courts adihit evidence of an abuser's prior cruel and violent
actions?5 Kansas courts also admit expert evidence to show a systematic
build up of fear and terror that would account for the battered wife's
reasonable apprehension of danger and need to defend herself with deadly
force?6 Although Kansas courts traditionally accepted this evidence, they
failed to accept it in Peggy Stewart's case?7 Instead of reviewing the record
to ascertain the presence of any evidence, the Stewart court judged and
weighed the evidence and thereby usurped the jury's function?8 The
Stewart court refused to apply its own rule concerning evidence in a self-
defense situation and concentrated the bulk of its analysis on the issue
of "imminent" danger?9
The court abruptly narrowed the time frame for the imminence of danger
In State v. Hundley,00 the court graphically described the terror and
fear that characterizes the battered woman:
The abuse is so severe, for so long a time, and the threat
of great bodily harm so constant, it creates a standard mental
attitude in its victims. Battered women are terror-stricken peo-
ple whose mental state is distorted and bears a marked
resemblance to that of a hostage or a prisoner of war. The horri-
ble beatings they are subjected to brainwash them into believ-
ing there is nothing they can do. They live in constant fear of
another eruption of violence.'0 1
The court described the battered woman's plight to illustrate the injustice
of using "immediate" instead of "imminent" when describing the way
the battered woman perceives danger.02 The Hundley court emphasized
the "buildup of terror and fear that had been systematically created over
a long period of time " ' 3 Later, the court repeated its comparison of the
battered woman's mental state to that of "hostages, prisoners of war, and
others under long-term life-threatening condition&' '10 4
" State v. Hundley, 236 Kan. at 464, 693 P.2d at 477.
Id. at 467, 693 P.2d at 479.
17 Stewart, 243 Kan. at __, 763 P.2d at 580 (Herd, J., dissenting).
" ld. See also State v. Kelly, 131 Kan. at 357, 291 P. at 945, "a killing is not justified unless ap-
prehension of immediate danger be reasonable, of which jury is judge."
Stewart, 243 Kan. at __ , 763 P.2d at 577-79.
oo236 Kan. at 461, 693 P.2d at 475.
... Id. at 467, 693 P.2d at 479.
oId. at 467-68, 693 P.2d at 479.
103 Id.
'o Id. (emphasis added)
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It is significant that the Hundley court analogized the battered
woman to a hostage or prisoner of war. In a hostage situation, where the
victim is told he will be killed in a week, it is commonly held that he
can act with deadly force at any opportunity, rather than waiting until
the kidnapper is "standing over him with a knife."'"' "If a threatened
harm is such that it cannot be avoided if the intended victim waits until
the last moment, the principle of self-defense must permit him to act
earlier-as early as is required to defend himself effectively."'
0 6
The Hundley court had compared the battered woman to a hostage,
living in constant fear and under long-term life-threatening conditions.
If a hostage can seize the opportunity to defend herself, why should the
battered woman be prevented from doing the same? Peggy Stewart was
brutally terrorized for twelve years.07 She believed with virtual certain-
ty that her life was in danger.!08 After Mike had brutalized her throughout
the day and threatened her life, she found a loaded gun.0 9 Peggy knew
from past experience that she could not avoid the harm if she waited un-
til the last moment. 10 Mike was asleep, but on another occasion, Mike
had awakened her from sleep by beating her with a baseball bat." Sleep
was an uncertain lull in Mike's building hostility toward her. At one time
the Hundley court acknowledged that the battered woman was in an un-
ending life-threatening situation."2 Abruptly the Stewart court narrowed
the time frame and demanded an overt act contemporaneous with the
killing."13 The Stewart court paid lip-service to their traditional "immi-
nent" standard but, in actuality, demanded an immediate "confronta-
tional circumstance" contemporaneous with the killing.14 The court
pointedly stated that they would not make an exception for a defendant
who had suffered long-term domestic violence. 5 Peggy Stewart did not
need an exception. Mike brutalized and threatened her life all day and
then demanded that the terrified Peggy come to bed with him.! 6 Even
if an immediate standard was applied, the circumstances immediately
preceeding Mike's sleep were contemporaneous with the killing."7
101 See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 30, at 458.
106 Id.
107 State v. Stewart, 243 Kan. at __ , 763 P.2d at 574-76.
100 Id. at __, 763 P2d at 575.
109 Id.
110 Id. at __, 763 P.2d at 575-76.
Id. at __, 763 P.2d at 575.
112 State v. Hundley, 236 Kan. at 467, 693 P.2d at 479.
113 Stewart, 243 Kan. at __ , 763 P.2d at 578.
114 Id. at __. 763 P.2d at 577.
115 Id.
110 Id. at _ , 763 P.2d at 581.
117 Id. at ., 763 P2d at 577.
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SELF-DEFENSE AND BATTERED WOMEN
The court held that the jury did not properly weigh the
reasonableness of Peggy Stewart's perception of danger because they ap-
plied only the subjective standard and not the objective standard of
reasonableness.' s In truth, the Kansas objective standard of a reasonably
prudent battered woman is nothing more than an expanded subjective
standard. Could a reasonably prudent battered woman living in constant
fear and under life-threatening conditions, have acted differently than
Peggy acted? "Actually, to ask how a reasonably prudent battered woman
would have perceived the aggressor's demeanor results in applying a sub-
jective standard of reasonableness, i.e., from the viewpoint of defendant's
mental state."" 9
The court concluded that the twice-divorced Peggy Stewart knew
there were non-lethal methods of getting out of her relationship with
Mike.P' ° The same court had previously stated that battered women were
"brainwashed into believing there is nothing they can do."' 2 ' Peggy had
escaped once but Mike found her, brought her back home and threaten-
ed to kill her if she ever left again.'22 Research indicates that a battered
woman develops survival skills that keep her alive; these are skills
developed at the expense of escape skills.2 3 Peggy's behavior illustrates
how these survival skills narrow the battered woman's perceptions so she
focuses only on survival and misperceives other important information"24
For example, after she killed her husband, she fled wildly outside and
ran a mile to her neighbor's house, totally ignoring the car and truck
parked outside of her home.' 25
The Hundley court described the battered woman as living in con-
stant fear under long-term life-threatening conditions. 26 It insisted that
lie Id. at __, 763 P2d at 574.
lie State v. Hodges, 239 Kan. at 72, 716 P.2d at 569.
... Stewart, 243 Kan. at __, 763 P.2d at 576.
121 State v. Hundley, 236 Kan. at 467, 693 P2d at 479.
122 Stewart, 243 Kan. at __ , 763 P.2d at 575.
123 L. WALKER, supra note 51, at 33. Dr. Walker's interview data suggest that battered women learn
survival or coping skills to "keep them alive with minimal injuries" Id. Examining victim response
following a battering incident, Dr. Walker found marked movement toward passivity. Id. This is
consistent with learned helplessness theory research in which animal and human subjects adopted
passivity as the basic coping mechanism for survival. Id. As part of the coping process, the battered
woman narrows her perceptions and focuses only on survival, causing misperception of other im-
portant information and an inability to problem-solve options in order to escape from the relation-
ship. Nevertheless, despite the appreciable move toward passivity, Dr. Walker's data disclosed that,
even after repeated beatings, close to 50% of the women were able to take some affirmative action
to stay alive. Id.
124 Id.
'2 Stewart, 243 Kan. at __ , 763 P.2d at 582 (Herd, J., dissenting).
12i State v. Hundley, 236 Kan. at 467, 693 P2d at 479.
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"imminent" rather than "immediate" be used to describe the harm 2 7
However, the Stewart court chose to ignore a loaded gun, sexual abuse,
and veiled threats within hours of the killing. 2s Moreover, the Stewart
court applied an immediate standard and held that the jury had not pro-
perly weighed the reasonableness of Peggy Stewart's perception of harm.
Their rationale was that the jury did not consider how a reasonable bat-
tered woman would view the situation.'29 The Stewart court recited all
of the right descriptors about battered woman syndrome but failed to apply
them when analyzing the imminent danger that confronted Peggy
Stewart. 30
The court fears that battered woman syndrome will give women
a license to kill.
No jurisdiction holds that battered woman syndrome operates as
a defense to murder"31 The law does not favor a defendant because she
is a victim of battered woman syndrome.1 32 Courts nervously proclaim
that they do not intend to expand the justification for self-defense just
because the court admits evidence of battered woman syndrome
33
Courts harbor an unspoken fear that recognizing battered woman
syndrome will give women a license to kill1 Crime statistics do not sup-
port this fear. In 1984, and for at least thirty years before that time, women
accounted for approximately 13 percent of those arrested for homicide.135
During the past several years, more jurisdictions have admitted evidence
of battered woman syndrome to explain the reasonableness of the woman's
perception of danger. 3s Recent statistics indicate that women still repre-
sent only 12.5 percent of persons arrested for homicide. 37 It appears that
women have not, in fact, declared "open season on men."1 3s Battered
women kill their husbands in self-defense because they believe with vir-
tual certainty that they are in danger of being killed.
39
1.7 Id. at 467-68, 693 P.2d at 479.
128 Stewart, 243 Kan. at __ , 763 P.2d at 583 (Herd, J., dissenting).
129 Id. at _ , 763 P.2d at 579.
130 Id. at _ , 763 P.2d at 577. The Court acknowledged that traditional concepts of self-defense
may not apply to victims of long-term domestic violence. Further, the Court noted that given the
cumulative terror and probable inequality of size and strength, the victim might chose to defend
during a lull in the abuse, rather than while the conflict was raging. Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
12 Id. at __ , 763 P.2d at 578.
XU Rosewater, supra note 32.
's Comment, supra note 29, at 1680.
13 State v. Hodges, 239 Kan. at 68-69, 716 P.2d at 567.
s FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 181 (1987).
12 Note, supra note 8, at 930-31.
1 Rosewater, supra note 32.
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SELF-DEFENSE AND BATTERED WOMEN
Evidence of battered woman syndrome helps illustrate the influence
of numerous factors on "the woman's perception of her limited options
and need to use self-defense'1 4 0 Courts should examine all of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the killing in order to determine if the woman
held a reasonable belief that deadly force was necessary at the time she
acted.' 1 Courts should analyze the specific incident (e.g., murder) in the
context of a history of abuse.' 4 2 The abuser's sleep or inattention does not
automatically mean the woman was safe or not at risk.'4 3 From the bat-
tered woman's perception, "when he wakes up, she's had it; wherever she
runs, she's had it; wherever she is, she's had it "'1" Battered women do
not want a protected right to use deadly force, but rather the same right
to act in self-defense as any other victim of assault. 4 1 Without self-defense,
the only credible battered woman will be a dead one.0 1
CONCLUSION
In deciding Stewart, The Kansas Supreme Court: 1) failed to apply
its own precedent for self-defense instructions and 2) sidestepped its own
definition of imminent danger. In Stewart, the issue was whether self-
defense instructions were appropriate when a battered woman killed her
sleeping spouse. The court answered "no" because the woman was in no
imminent danger of death.
The Stewart court failed to apply its own well-established rule that
a defendant was entitled to self-defense instructions if there was any
evidence supporting self-defense. The court completely overlooked evidence
of past abuse, a present escalation of violence, the husband's threats to
kill the victim should she attempt to run away, and expert testimony that
the battered spouse was in a life-threatening situation.
Further, the Stewart court paid lip-service to its own definition of
"imminent" danger and also ignored its explicit rejection of an "im-
mediate" standard. Previously, Kansas courts analogized the battered
woman to a hostage living in constant fear and under life-threatening
conditions. The courts recognized that these circumstances had to be con-
sidered in deciding the reasonableness of a battered woman's perception
of danger. Abruptly the Stewart court narrowed the relevant time frame.
140 State v. Hundley, 236 Kan. at 468, 693 P.2d at 480.
141 State v. Stewart, 243 Kan. at __ , 763 P.2d at 577.
"4 Comment, supra note 29, at 1704.
... Stewart, 243 Kan. at _ , 763 P.2d at 578.
1" Rosewater, supra note 32.
145 Hudsmith, supra note 28, at 990 n.58.
14 Rosewater, supra note 32.
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The court required an overt act "contemporaneous" with the killing. Con-
sequently, the court held that the jury did not properly weigh the
reasonableness of Peggy Stewart's perception of danger because they did
not apply the objective standard of a reasonably prudent battered woman.
Finally, the Stewart court reacted to unfounded fears that evidence
of battered woman syndrome will give women a license to kill. Unfor-
tunately, unless battered women have a valid self-defense plea, the law
appears to give abusive husbands a license to kill.
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